

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 05353 01 OF 03 071652Z

42

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W

----- 041789

P R 071549Z JUL 76

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3120

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 5353

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENTS OF JULY 7, 1976

(SALT TWO - 1052)

THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF JULY 7, 1976. QUOTE

MR. MINISTER,

I

ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS OVER THE PAST FOUR MONTHS OUR TWO DELEGATIONS HAVE EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE LIMITATION OF MIRV LAUNCHERS, THE PROVISIONS REQUIRED TO ASSURE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THESE LIMITATIONS, AND THE REQUIRED DEFINITIONS. I BELIEVE THESE EXCHANGES HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IN OBTAINING AN UNDERSTANDING OF OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS AND TODAY IN CONTINUANCE OF OUR DISCUSSION I WANT TO MAKE A PROPOSAL ON THESE SUBJECTS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 05353 01 OF 03 071652Z

II

AT OUR MEETING OF JULY 23 THE SOVIET DELEGATION PROPOSED NEW LANGUAGE FOR PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE V, PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE II, AND AN AGREED STATEMENT TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE II DEFINING THE TERM "INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE".

I AM PLEASED TO NOTE THAT IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL THE TERM "LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS" HAS REPLACED THE TERM "ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS".

I AM ALSO PLEASED TO NOTE THAT IN THE NEW SOVIET PROPOAL CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE II AND THE ACCOMPANYING AGREED STATEMENT. THE TWO SIDES ARE NOW IN AGREEMENT ON THE LANGUAGE FOR THE AGREED STATEMENT AS CONTAINED IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF JUNE 23.

IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE II OF THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL, THE TERM "LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS" IS DEFINED AS "SUCH LAUNCHERS WHEREIN ARE DEPLOYED MISSILES WITH TWO OR MORE REENTRY VEHICLES WHICH ARE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE TO SEPARATE AIM-POINTS ALONG TRAJECTORIES WHICH ARE UNRELATED TO EACH OTHER". IN THIS REGARD THE US CONSIDERS THAT THE PHRASE "WHEREIN ARE DEPLOYED" IS AMBIGUOUS. THEREFORE, IN ORDER TO REMOVE THIS AMBIGUITY, THE US WILL PROPOSE ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE FOR THIS PROVISION OF THE AGREEMENT.

III

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, I AM PRESENTING A REVISED PROPOSAL FOR DEALING WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT RELATED TO THE LIMITATION OF MIRV LAUNCHERS. THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION THE PROPOSAL TABLED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION ON JUNE 23, CONSISTS OF SIX ELEMENTS. THE FIRST ELEMENT IS THE MIRV LAUNCHER LIMITATION WHICH IS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE V. IN THIS PROVISION THE US IS REPLACING THE TERM "MIRV SYSTEMS" WITH THE TERM "MIRVS" RESULTING IN THE FOLLOWING FORMULATION:

"WITHIN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE III EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO LIMIT LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 05353 01 OF 03 071652Z

WITH MIRVS, AND ASBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, TO AN AGGREGATE NUMBER NOT TO EXCEED 1320."

WITH THIS CHANGE THE TWO SIDES ARE IN AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT OF THIS PROVISION, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE REFERENCE TO ASBMS.

THE SECOND ELEMENT IS THE DEFINITION WHICH IS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE II. IN THIS PROVISION THE US PROPOSES

THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE:

"LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES (MIRVS) ARE LAUNCHERS FOR LAUNCHING AN ICBM OR SLBM WITH A BOOSTER WHICH IS OF A TYPE THAT HAS BEEN FLIGHT TESTED ONE OR MORE TIMES WITH TWO OR MORE REENTRY VEHICLES WHICH CAN BE DIRECTED TO SEPARATE AIM-POINTS ALONG TRAJECTORIES WHICH ARE UNRELATED TO EACH OTHER."

THIS LANGUAGE ADOPTS THE SOVIET APPROACH OF DEFINING "LAUNCHERS" OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. IT ALSO INCORPORATES, FOR ICBMS AND SLBMS, THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MIRVED MISSILE DEFINITION, PREVIOUSLY CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE II, WHICH THE US CONTINUES TO VIEW AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF OUR PROPOSAL.

THE THIRD ELEMENT IS THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM "INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE" WHICH IS CONTAINED IN THE FIRST AGREED STATEMENT TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE II.

"REENTRY VEHICLES ARE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE: (A) IF, AFTER SEPARATION FROM THE BOOSTER, MANEUVERING AND TARGETING OF THE REENTRY VEHICLES TO SEPARATE AIM-POINTS ALONG TRAJECTORIES WHICH ARE UNRELATED TO EACH OTHER ARE ACCOMPLISHED BY MEANS OF DEVICES WHICH ARE INSTALLED IN A SELF-CONTAINED DISPENSING MECHANISM OR ON THE REENTRY VEHICLES, AND WHICH ARE BASED ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC OR OTHER COMPUTERS IN COMBINATION WITH DEVICES USING JET ENGINES, INCLUDING ROCKET ENGINES, OR AERODYNAMIC SYSTEMS; (B) IF MANEUVERING AND TARGETING OF THE REENTRY VEHICLES TO SEPARATE AIM-POINTS ALONG TRAJECTORIES WHICH ARE UNRELATED TO EACH OTHER ARE ACCOMPLISHED BY MEANS OF OTHER DEVICES WHICH MAY BE DEVELOPED IN THE FUTURE."

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SALT T 05353 01 OF 03 071652Z

THIS LANGUAGE IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF JUNE 23.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 05353 02 OF 03 071705Z

41

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W

----- 042041

P R 071549Z JUL 76

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3121

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 5353

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

THE US PROPOSES THAT WHAT WAS THE FIRST AGREED STATEMENT TO
PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE V NOW BECOME THE SECOND AGREED STATEMENT
TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE II AND THAT IT BE REVISED TO READ
AS FOLLOWS:

"THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THE DEFINITION OF THE
TERM 'LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS' CONTAINED
IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE II INCLUDES ALL LAUNCHERS DEVELOPED
AND DEPLOYED FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS.
IF A LAUNCHER HAS CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED AN ICBM OR SLBM
EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, ALL ECBM OR SLBM LAUNCHERS OF THAT TYPE
WILL BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND DEPLOYED FOR
LAUNCHING SUCH MISSILES.

FACTS WHICH COULD SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT A LAUNCHER HAS
CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED AN IC M OR AN SLBM EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS WOULD
INCLUDE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRESENCE OF SUCH A MISSILE OR OF
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FOR SUCH A MISSILE AT OR IN THE VICINITY OF
THE LAUNCHER."

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 05353 02 OF 03 071705Z

IN CONNECTION WITH THIS AGREED STATEMENT, AS I SAID ON MARCH 23,
THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A TIME-PHASING RULE FOR SLBM
LAUNCHERS OF A PARTICULAR TYPE AFTER A LAUNCHER OF THAT TYPE HAS
FIRST CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED A MIRVED MISSILE.

THE US PROPOSES THAT WHAT WAS THE SECOND AGREED STATEMENT TO
PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE V NOW BECOME THE THIRD AGREED STATEMENT TO

PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE II AND THAT IT BE REVISED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"THE PARTIES AGREE THAT LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS CURRENTLY ARE THE FOLLOWING:

FOR THE UNITED STATES,.....;

FOR THE SOVIET UNION,.....

THE PARTIES FURTHER AGREE THAT LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS NOT EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS CURRENTLY ARE THE FOLLOWING:

FOR THE UNITED STATES,;

FOR THE SOVIET UNION,....."

FOR ITS PART THE US WOULD SPECIFY THAT ITS LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS CURRENTLY ARE THE TYPES OF LAUNCHERS WHICH HAVE CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED THE MINUTEMAN III ICBM OR THE POSEIDON SLBM; AND THAT ITS LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS NOT EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS CURRENTLY ARE THE TYPES OF LAUNCHERS WHICH HAVE CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED ONLY THE MINUTEMAN II ICBM, THE TITAN II ICBM, OR THE POLARIS SLBM.

THE SIXTH ELEMENT IS THE DEFINITION OF AN ASBM EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, WHICH IS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE II. THE US PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING FORMULATION FOR THIS PROVISION:

"AN ASBM EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS IS ANY ASBM WITH A BOOSTER WHICH IS OF A TYPE THAT HAS BEEN FLIGHT TESTED ONE OR MORE TIMES WITH TWO OR MORE REENTRY VEHICLES WHICH CAN BE DIRECTED TO SEPARATE AIM-POINTS ALONG TRAJECTORIES WHICH ARE UNRELATED TO EACH OTHER."

THE FIRST AGREED STATEMENT TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE II, AS JUST PROPOSED, WOULD ALSO APPLY TO THIS PROVISION.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 05353 02 OF 03 071705Z

IV

MR. MINISTER, TODAY I HAVE PRESENTED A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL FOR DEALING WITH THE ISSUES OF MIRV LAUNCHER LIMITATIONS. THIS PROPOSAL REPRESENTS THE US VIEWS AND AT THE SAME TIME ACCOMMODATES MANY OF THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE. I WILL LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR FURTHER VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT. UNQUOTE

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

JULY 7, 1976

QUOTE:

MR. MINISTER:

I

TODAY I WANT TO ELABORATE ON THE RATIONALE FOR THE UNITED STATES DATA-BASE PROPOSAL AND FURTHER EXPLAIN THE UNITED STATES POSITION. I WILL ALSO SUGGEST HOW NEGOTIATIONS COULD PROCEED TO REACH AN AGREED DATA BASE.

II

ON MARCH 2, WHEN THE UNITED STATES FIRST MADE ITS DATA-BASE PROPOSAL, I STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO PREFER THAT THE DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF EXCESS SYSTEMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XI BE COMPLETED NO LATER THAN OCTOBER 3, 1977. I ALSO STATED THAT, IN ITS APPROACH TO ARTICLE XVII, THE UNITED STATES IS SEEKING TO INSURE UNIFORM APPLICATION BY BOTH SIDES OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE AGGREGATE LIMITATIONS. OUR CONCERNS ARE WHETHER SPECIFIC ITEMS OBSERVED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS ARE TO BE INCLUDED OR NOT INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE LIMITATIONS AND HOW, FOR EXAMPLE, WE CAN ASSURE THAT BOTH PARTIES HAVE THE SAME VIEW ON THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SUBJECT TO INCLUSION IN THE AGGREGATES AND THE NUMBER WHICH WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION AS EXCESS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SALT T 05353 02 OF 03 071705Z

III

IT WAS WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND THAT THE UNITED STATES PROPOSED ON MARCH 2 THAT BY THE TIME OF SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT THE SIDES BE IN ACCORD ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN EACH CATEGORY POSSESSED BY EACH SIDE AS OF THAT DATE. CHANGES TO THESE NUMBERS WOULD BE REPORTED TWICE A YEAR IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. I ALSO STATED THAT, IF AGREEMENT ON THIS PROPOSAL COULD BE REACHED, THE UNITED STATES, ON ITS PART, WOULD BE PREPARED TO AGREE THAT THE REQUIRED DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF EXCESS SYSTEMS BEGIN NOT LATER THAN THE DATE OF EXPIRATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND BE COMPLETED WITHIN CERTAIN SPECIFIED PERIODS OF TIME AFTER THAT DATE. IN ADDITION, THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO OMIT PARAGRAPHS 2(A) AND 2(I) OF ARTICLE IVII, AS WELL AS THE OBLIGATION OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION, THE REFERENCES TO "CONVERSION", AND THE BRACKETED REFERENCE TO DATES IN PARAGRAPH 2(B) OF THAT ARTICLE.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 05353 03 OF 03 072306Z

60

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

/026 W

----- 047024

P R 071549Z JUL 76

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3122

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 SECTIONS SALT TWO GENEVA 5353

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

IV

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT, IF DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF EXCESS SYSTEMS IS NOT TO BE COMPLETED UNTIL A SPECIFIED TIME PERIOD AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO AGREE ON THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE NUMBER REQUIRED TO BE DISMANTLED OR DESTROYED. ONLY IF BOTH PARTIES REACH AGREEMENT ON A DATA BASE CAN EACH PARTY BE SATISFIED, IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, THAT THE OTHER PARTY IS PERFORMING ANY DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION REQUIRED TO BRING IT INTO CONFORMITY WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT.

IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT BOTH SIDES AGREE ON WHETHER SPECIFIC ITEMS ARE TO BE INCLUDED OR NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENT. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT, BECAUSE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE AND COMPLEX NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT, THE DATA BASE SHOULD INCLUDE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 05353 03 OF 03 072306Z

NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BY CATEGORY. THIS WOULD INSURE THE UNIFORM APPLICATION BY BOTH SIDES OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE AGGREGATE LIMITATIONS AND, THEREFORE, WOULD ELIMINATE UNNECESSARY PROBLEMS WITH COMPLIANCE RESULTING FROM POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND AMBIGUITIES.

THE UNITED STATES DATA-BASE PROPOSAL, TOGETHER WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED CHANGES WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLES XI AND XVII, ADDRESSES CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY BOTH PARTIES. ON THE ONE HAND, IT PROVIDES TIME AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF EXCESS SYSTEMS AND MEETS THE SOVIET CONCERN REGARDING PRIOR NOTIFICATION. NEITHER SIDE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ITS PLANNED FUTURE FORCES OR TO GIVE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN THE FUTURE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE UNITED STATES PROPOSAL WOULD INSURE THAT EACH PARTY WOULD HAVE CONFIDENCE AT THE TIME OF SIGNATURE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT THAT BOTH PARTIES HAVE THE SAME UNDERSTANDING OF ITS PROVISIONS.

V

MR. MINISTER, IT IS THE UNITED STATES VIEW THAT THE WORK REQUIRED TO REACH ACCORD ON A DATA BASE NEED NOT AND SHOULD NOT SLOW THE PACE OF THE WORK OF THE DELEGATIONS ON THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT. IT WAS WITH THIS IN MIND THAT ON MARCH 5 I SUGGESTED A MEETING OF THE CHIEFS OF DELEGATION TO CONSIDER HOW THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED.

IN ESTABLISHING A DATA BASE, THE SIDES WILL NEED TO REACH A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THE CATEGORIES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR WHICH NUMBERS WILL BE PROVIDED AND ON THE NUMBERS THEMSELVES.

TO THIS END, THE SIDES SHOULD, AS A FIRST STEP, BEGIN DISCUSSIONS ON THE CATEGORIES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. SECONDLY, EACH SIDE COULD PROVIDE NUMBERS BASED ON ITS CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT. EACH SIDE COULD THEN ANALYZE THE NUMBERS SUBMITTED BY THE OTHER SIDE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES CONCERNING THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 05353 03 OF 03 072306Z

THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THAT THIS EFFORT WOULD NOT RESULT IN A COMPLETE AND FINAL VERSION OF A COMMON DATA BASE UNTIL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON ALL RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE JOINT DRAFT

TEXT. HOWEVER, SUCH AN EFFORT WOULD GIVE BOTH PARTIES AN OPPORTUNITY, PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, TO DEAL WITH QUESTIONS WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO AMBIGUITIES OR MISUNDERSTANDINGS OVER INTERPRETATION OF PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

VI

MR. MINISTER, I HOPE THAT TODAY'S EXPLANATION OF THE RATIONALE FOR THE DATA-BASE PROPOSAL AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLES XI AND XVII OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT, AS WELL AS OUR SUGGESTION ON HOW BOTH PARTIES COULD REACH A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON A COMMON DATA BASE, WILL BE HELPFUL TO THE SOVIET SIDE IN CONSIDERING OUR PROPOSAL. I LOOK FORWARD TO ANY QUESTIONS THE SOVIET DELEGATION MAY HAVE, AND TO ENTERING INTO DISCUSSIONS AS TO HOW THE SIDES CAN PROCEED TO ESTABLISH A COMMON DATA BASE.

UNQUOTEJOHNSON

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), MEETING REPORTS, SPEECHES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 JUL 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976SALTT05353
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760262-0370
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760783/aaaacvha.tel
Line Count: 457
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 MAY 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03 MAY 2004 by ElyME>; APPROVED <04 MAY 2004 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENTS OF JULY 7, 1976 (SALT TWO - 1052)
TAGS: PARM, US, UR, (JOHNSON, U ALEXIS)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006